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Abstract
The Argentine economy is in a complicated transition phase. To correct the major fiscal 
and inflationary imbalances built up in the previous decade, the new government that 
took office in December 2015 opted for a gradual fiscal adjustment, supported by a 
situation of abundant international liquidity. In parallel, the Argentine central bank 
assumed ambitious inflation-reducing objectives. However, in 2018 the lack of progress 
on the inflation front, the tightening of international financial conditions and a severe 
drought placed Argentina under the market’s gaze and prevented it from pursuing the 
financing of this gradual adjustment; accordingly, the government decided to apply for 
IMF financial assistance. The agreement with the Fund, approved in June and amended 
in October 2018, plans for a rapid fiscal and monetary adjustment that will provide for a 
reduction in its twin deficits (fiscal and external alike) and an effective decline in inflation, 
moving the economy onto a stable growth path. The success of the programme, to which 
the Argentine authorities have made a clear commitment, is nonetheless subject to 
internal and external risks, and poses a significant challenge for the country.
Keywords: Argentina, IMF, Stand-By Arrangement (SBA), economic growth, macroeconomic 
risks, debt sustainability.
JEL codes: O11, O54.
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Argentina is in a complicated economic transition phase, which began with the change of 
government in December 2015. The new government took charge of an economy which 
had built up major macroeconomic imbalances and set in train a series of reforms aimed 
at liberalising the exchange rate and correcting these maladjustments. The authorities 
opted for a gradual fiscal adjustment path, which it was possible to maintain during 2016 
and 2017, against a background of abundant international liquidity and appetite for risk at 
the global level. However, the lack of progress in curtailing inflation, the tightening of 
international financial conditions as from spring 2018 and a severe drought, which 
diminished agricultural output and exports in the first half of the year, made it very difficult 
for Argentina to continue funding this gradual adjustment on the markets. The government 
duly decided to request IMF assistance in May this year. 
This article analyses, first, the economic framework proposed by the new government 
(second section). It then details how, in the current setting of high vulnerabilities, the 
deterioration in external financial conditions and the turbulence on financial markets led 
to the request for financial assistance from the IMF (third section). The agreement with 
the Fund is described in the fourth section. Lastly, the fifth section briefly draws 
conclusions. 
In December 2015, Argentina was facing a build-up of macroeconomic imbalances, 
microeconomic distortions and institutional weakness. The country did not have access 
to international financial markets owing to the blocking of its external debt payments as 
a result of its “holdouts” problem (Argentine bondholders who had not accepted the 
restructuring offered by the previous government). Consequently, the strong growth in 
public spending and the resulting deficit were essentially funded through monetary 
financing. Central bank financing of the deficit amounted to 5.3% of GDP in 2014 and led 
inflation to rates between 20% and 40%, on unofficial estimates.1 At the same time, the 
deterioration in international competitiveness, owing to the overvaluation of the official 
exchange rate, and the impossibility of attracting foreign capital led to a strong reduction 
in currency reserves, against the background of the high external deficit. The introduction 
of exchange controls restricted imports, impairing economic growth, and was conducive 
to the emergence of a parallel exchange rate market. Moreover, agricultural exports had 
high taxes placed on them.
The new government, which took charge in December 2015, proposed a radical reforms 
plan, which it decided to implement at different speeds. The authorities prioritised the 
liberalisation of foreign exchange arrangements to correct the overvaluation of the official 
exchange rate, to eliminate the distortion that a parallel market entailed and to put an end 
to the restrictions on goods imports, which limited the functioning of the Argentine chain 
Introduction
The new economic model 
1  The official inflation statistics and the national accounts lost credibility as from 2007, which led to a proliferation 
of private estimates and to the non-existence of an official price index to steer monetary policy. The government 
used price controls and a freeze on public prices as inflation management measures, adding significant 
distortions to relative prices. Campos et al. (2018) estimate Argentine inflation using provincial data. From 2007 
to 2015 the year-on-year rate of inflation in Argentina was 25.8%, peaking at 38.9% in September 2014. 
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of production. Exchange controls were eliminated and a “managed float” exchange rate 
regime was introduced. On the monetary policy front, the government specified a 
framework of highly demanding inflation targets, to converge on inflation of 5% in 2019, at 
the end of its four-year mandate, and it set a declining path for transfers from the central 
bank to the Treasury. 
In fiscal policy, a medium-term consolidation plan setting out gradual reductions in the 
primary fiscal deficit to 2019 was announced.2 Further, the government finalised a 
“holdouts” agreement, which enabled it to tap the international debt markets once more, 
against a backdrop of high appetite for risk3; nonetheless, foreign direct investment 
inflows did not increase significantly. Generally, the policy mix proposed by the 
government was favourably received, although it was argued in some quarters that it 
was not enough to resolve Argentina’s twin-deficit (fiscal and current account) problem 
(see Charts 1.1 and 1.2). 
The reforms and policies implemented brought the Argentine economy out of isolation, 
growth turned positive again in 2017 and the central bank built up reserves thanks to 
portfolio investment inflows. However, the current account deficit widened and dollar-
denominated public debt increased, while the central bank used short-term debt issues 
SOURCE: Datastream.
The new government, which came to power in December 2015, opted for a series of reforms aimed at liberalising the exchange rate and correcting the 
economy's imbalances. The authorities opted for a gradual fiscal adjustment path, which they were able to maintain in 2016 and 2017 against a 
background of abundant international liquidity and global appetite for risk.
IN 2015, ARGENTINA FACED A MACROECONOMIC SITUATION MARKED BY MAJOR IMBALANCES, POSTING 
HIGH TWIN DEFICITS (FISCAL AND CURRENT ACCOUNT)
CHART 1
-7
-5
-3
-1
1
3
5
2005
Q1
2007
Q1
2009
Q1
2011
Q1
2013
Q1
2015
Q1
2017
Q1
TOTAL PRIMARY ANNUAL PRIMARY DEFICIT TARGET
1  TOTAL AND PRIMARY BUDGET BALANCE
% of GDP
Initial target 
for 2018
Current target 
for 2018
-8
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
8
10
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016 2018
2  CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE
% of GDP
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
2  The primary fiscal deficit targets were 4.8% of GDP in 2016, 4.2% in 2017, 3.2% in 2018 and 2.2% in 2019. 
Expenditure-cutting measures focused on eliminating energy and transport subsidies. On the revenue side, a tax 
amnesty was approved for assets located abroad, which partly offset the loss of revenue relating to the reduction 
of distortionary taxes, such as those on the export of agricultural goods, and to the decline in economic activity. 
In 2017, the government came to fiscal agreements with the provinces whereunder the latter undertook to cap 
increases in nominal expenditure at levels below that of inflation.
3  After regaining access to international financial markets, the Argentine government was able to reduce central 
bank financing to 4.4% of GDP in 2015, 2.0% in 2016, 1.5% in 2017, and a further reduction to 0.5% in 2018 
was projected. 
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(central bank bills known as LEBACs by their Argentine acronym) as a sterilisation 
instrument to align the quantity of money in circulation (and the exchange rate) with 
monetary policy objectives. In sum, the Argentine economy continued to evidence 
vulnerabilities, which were masked by foreign investors’ search for returns.
In December 2017, against a still-favourable external background, the government decided 
to relax its inflation targets4, so as to ease the pressure on the real exchange rate, which 
was deemed to be over-appreciated, and, in January 2018, the central bank cut its policy 
interest rate on two occasions (by 75 bp each time), arguing that the change in the inflation 
target allowed a more lax monetary policy. However, the change in targets was interpreted 
as a loss of independence by the central bank, which led to an increase in inflation 
expectations and to the depreciation of the peso against the dollar, meaning that the 
central bank had to halt the cycle of interest-rate cuts (see Chart 2.1). 
The downward pressures on the peso continued in March and April, strengthened by 
domestic and external causes alike. On the domestic front, inflation and expectations 
remained high, and a severe drought affected harvests, reducing the expected currency 
inflows for agricultural exports.5 Externally, the consequences of the US monetary policy 
normalisation began to be clearly felt in a reduction in global appetite for risk, with a 
greater impact on emerging markets. The heavy central bank interventions to sustain the 
peso on the currency market (see Chart 2.2) were unable to contain the currency’s 
depreciation, and the central bank opted to raise its policy interest rate to 40% and to take 
measures to increase the supply of dollars on the market.6 In parallel, the government 
announced stricter primary fiscal deficit targets. However, these measures only managed 
to check the pressures on the exchange rate temporarily, and on 8 May, faced with fresh 
capital outflows, the Argentine government requested IMF assistance. 
On 20 June, the IMF Executive Board approved a three-year Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) 
with Argentina (see Box 1). The agreement envisaged access to $50 billion on loan (the 
biggest programme in the IMF’s history, although not when measured in terms of quotas or of 
GDP, 9%), with a first disbursement of $15 billion at the start of the programme, while the 
authorities signalled that the remaining amount was precautionary in nature. The aim was to 
restore the international financial markets’ confidence in the country, to shore up the credibility 
of the central bank’s monetary policy framework, to lessen balance of payments pressures 
and to protect the most vulnerable sectors of society. In the area of macroeconomic policies, 
inflation targets were basically eased7 and a swifter fiscal adjustment was introduced.
The agreement with the Fund initially improved market sentiment: in July, the volatility on 
financial markets eased considerably, and the exchange rate stabilised. However, from 
early August significant pressures on the exchange rate and on country risk began to be 
felt again (see Chart 2.3), to which – once more – a combination of domestic and external 
factors contributed. On the external front, the tightening of financial conditions for the 
emerging countries, capital flight to safe-haven assets and the escalating trade disputes 
between the United States and China played a relevant role. Domestically, judicial enquiries 
The deterioration in 
external financial 
conditions in 2018
Agreement with the IMF 
and a restrictive twist to 
economic policies 
4  It raised them by 5 pp in 2018 and 2019.
5  Furthermore, the income tax on foreign holders of LEBACs (central bank bills) also came into force. 
6  The policy interest rate increased on 27 April (+300 bp), 3 May (+300 bp) and 4 May (+675 bp). The central bank 
also approved a regulatory change, limiting the amount of dollars that commercial banks could use to meet their 
liquidity requirements.
7  The initial targets were 15% in 2018, 10% in 2019 and 5% in 2019. Under the June agreement the targets 
became 27% in 2018, 17% in 2019, 13% in 2020 and 9% in 2021.
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into certain corruption cases,8 large-scale redemptions of central bank bills and the 
perception of potential failure in achieving the objectives agreed upon with the IMF were 
likewise relevant. 
To reduce the impact of these events on inflation and check the ongoing depreciation of 
the peso, the authorities added an even more restrictive bias to their economic policies. 
In August, the central bank increased its policy interest rate to 60%9 (see Chart 2.4) and, in 
the fiscal arena, stricter objectives than those included in the initial agreement with the 
SOURCES: Datastream and BCRA (Argentine central bank).
a Since October 2018, the inflation targeting-based monetary policy framework has been replaced by one based on ceilings for the growth of the monetary base. 
The central bank's benchmark rate is thus determined endogenously.
Following the tightening of financial conditions for the emerging economies, the financial market penalised the combination of a gradual fiscal adjustment 
and the relatively insignificant headway in combating inflation. The outcome was heavy capital outflows and a depreciation of the peso, which led to 
intervention on foreign exchange markets, to the rise in policy interest rates and, finally, to the request for assistance from the IMF.
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8  The award of public works contracts between 2005 and 2015.
9  These changes were announced at two extraordinary meetings convened by the central bank: one in mid-
August, at which the interest rate was raised by 500 bp to 45%; and another at which the policy interest rate 
was raised by 1500 bp to 60%. The Argentine central bank engaged, moreover, in forward guidance, 
undertaking to maintain the level of its benchmark interest rate above 60% until December 2018, initially, and 
subsequently until inflation expectations did not fall for two consecutive months, and it raised its reserve 
requirement by 5 pp.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 5 ECONOMIC BULLETIN ARGENTINA: ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN AN ADVERSE INTERNATIONAL SETTING
IMF for 2019 (primary balance in equilibrium10) and 2020 (primary surplus of 1% of GDP) 
were announced in September, as were new fiscal measures. 
In parallel, the authorities renegotiated certain aspects of the agreement with the IMF, 
including a change in the monetary policy framework, and an increase in and bringing 
forward of the funds envisaged under the arrangement11, abandoning the preventive 
nature of the funds, in order to meet fiscal and current account balance requirements up 
to the end of 2019. The revised agreement was approved by the IMF Board on 26 October. 
As regards monetary policy, and given the failure of the inflation targeting-based framework 
as a nominal anchor of the economy, it was opted to switch to control of the monetary 
SOURCES: Datastream, BCRA (Argentine central bank) and IMF.
a The inflation target was abandoned in the revision of the agreement approved by the IMF Executive Board on 26 October 2018.
The Argentine economy posted a decline in 2018 Q2 (-4.2% y-o-y). The exchange rate underwent fresh downward pressures in August, subsequently 
stabilising following the announcement of the revision of the SBA with the IMF. Inflation remains on an upward path, owing mainly to the effects of the 
depreciation of the peso, pending the effects of the new monetary policy measures.
THE RAPID DETERIORATION IN MACROECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL VARIABLES GAVE RISE TO A REVISION 
OF THE SBA WITH THE IMF
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10  The draft 2019 Budget includes the following assumptions for 2019: a decline of 0.5% in GDP (after a projected 
fall of 2.4% for 2018), an average exchange rate of 40.10 pesos/dollar and inflation of 23%. 
11  As Box 1 indicates, the changes in the terms of the SBA agreement entail the end of its preventive nature, an 
increase in the size of the programme (+$6.3 billion to $56.3 billion) and a bringing forward of funds (+$19 billion, 
for a total of $50.5 billion until end-2019), with the possibility of using them as budgetary support.
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base, the growth in which is restricted to 0% until June 2019.12 As to foreign exchange 
policy, given the difficulties in supporting the exchange rate, especially with the low level 
of reserves, central bank interventions will be restricted to a limited amount on occasions 
on which the exchange rate lies outside broad bands set at ±15% around a central 
exchange rate. Since 1 October the exchange rate band has stood between 34 and 44 
pesos per dollar, and the central exchange rate will adjust daily at a rate of 3% month-on-
month until end-2018 (see Chart 3.2).13 
The decline in GDP in 2018 Q2 (-4.2% year-on-year, see Chart 3.1), while compatible with 
the GDP path for 2018 and 2019 incorporated into the agreement (with rates of change of 
-2.6% and -1.6%, respectively), is indicative of the restrictive impact that the adjustment 
will have in the short term. Also, inflation is holding at high levels, having posted a significant 
rise during the year to a rate of 40.5% in September (see Chart 3.3), partly as a result of 
the depreciation of the peso. That illustrates the difficulty of bringing about the reduction 
in inflation expectations needed for the programme to be successful. Beyond domestic 
factors, developments in the international environment will also be an important component 
for assessing the effects of the agreement. 
The Argentine authorities face the enormous challenge of correcting the imbalances built up in 
their economy over years of deficient economic management. The government’s plans to 
address this challenge are very ambitious, but also necessary to lead the economy onto a path 
of stable and sustained growth. The fiscal and monetary adjustment measures programmed 
will have a highly restrictive impact on growth in the short term, albeit bearing in mind the 
budgetary provisions to maintain a floor for social spending. Accordingly, the authorities should 
apply them credibly, resolutely and transparently to provide for their social and political 
acceptance, and to bring about a rapid downward adjustment in inflation expectations. 
In this connection, Argentina has the technical and financial support of the IMF and of 
other international financial institutions. However, the risks are also very significant. These 
range from a potential negative interaction between the course of the exchange rate and 
the growth and inflation path or debt sustainability (with a substantial portion denominated 
in foreign currency), to higher economic and social costs stemming from the adjustment. 
In this respect, one favourable factor is the IMF’s bringing forward of the financial funds, 
which will enable the possible consequences derived from less favourable global credit 
conditions than in the past to be postponed until 2020. 
5.11.2018.
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12  Adjustments will be permitted to take into account the seasonal oscillations in the demand for money (December 
2018 and June 2019). From June 2019, the growth of the monetary base will be restricted to 1% per month, 
until end-2019. 
13  If the peso stands above this upper limit, the central bank will carry out sales of up to $150 million per day. 
Where the peso to stand below it, dollar purchases that could be sterilised would be made. The monetary 
base would only increase if there were signs of confidence in the peso and the counterpart would be an 
increase in reserves.
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BOX 1 THE IMF’S AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA
In June the Executive Board of the IMF approved, via the 
emergency financing mechanism, a three-year Stand-By 
Arrangement (SBA) for Argentina amounting to $50  billion 
(35.4 billion special drawing rights (SDRs)) equivalent to 1,110% of 
its quota in the IMF. The arrangement envisaged an immediate 
initial disbursement of $15 billion (333% of Argentina’s quota) to 
cover estimated financing needs until year-end and the remainder 
is drawable in twelve quarterly tranches of equal amount 
($2.9  billion each) to meet additional financial needs under 
scenarios with more adverse rollover rates on debt. The Argentine 
authorities drew down the first disbursement when the programme 
was approved and stated that they did not intend to request 
further disbursements and considered the remainder of the 
arrangement as precautionary.
In the IMF’s opinion, Argentina met the four criteria of the exceptional 
access framework1 since: a) it had exceptionally large balance of 
payment needs, which could not be met with normal lending 
limits; b) although there was not a high probability that its public 
debt was sustainable, it had additional sources of financing2 which 
could improve sustainability; c) it had access to private capital 
markets and a favourable long-term outlook with the successful 
implementation of the programme and support from the 
international community; and d) it had sufficient political and 
institutional capacity, and was committed to implementing an 
IMF-supported programme.
Concerned by how the arrangement was communicated and the 
associated risks of stigmatisation, the IMF emphasised that it should 
not be perceived as an austerity programme and underlined the high 
degree of its ownership by the authorities. The programme’s 
conditionality set targets for primary deficit ceilings (-1.9% in 2019 
and equilibrium in 2020), a reserves floor (rising to $7.5 billion in June 
2019 and $28  billion by the end of the programme), the non-
accumulation of domestic and external debt payment arrears, the 
absence of monetary financing (in order to reduce inflation to a single-
digit figure by end-2021), and the social assistance spending floor 
(1.3% of GDP in 2018). Similarly, it envisaged the strengthening of the 
central bank’s institutional autonomy, its recapitalisation and greater 
staff involvement of the monetary institution in the management of 
the funds provided by the IMF. As a result of the authorities’ favourable 
attitude in the negotiation of outstanding arrears to private creditors, 
it was possible to approve the programme under the IMF’s lending 
into arrears policy.
The rapid deterioration of the macroeconomic and financial 
projections at the end of summer led to a review of the agreement 
– completed by the Executive Board on 26 October – which envisages 
the end of its precautionary status, increases total lending by 
$6.3 billion to $56.3 billion (1,277% of the quota), provides a further 
$19 billion which is drawable by Argentina until end-2019 (Chart 1)3 
and reformulates the original conditionality.4 Substantial frontloading 
SOURCE: IMF.
Year
Type of 
arrangement
Starting Ending Millions of SDRs % of quota % of GDP
Millions of 
SDRs
% approved
1983 SBA 24-Jan-83 23-Jan-84 1,500 187 1.4 601 40
1984 SBA 28-Dec-84 30-Jun-86 1,183 106 0.9 1,183 100
1987 SBA 23-Jul-87 30-Sep-88 948 85 1.1 617 65
1989 SBA 10-Nov-89 31-Mar-91 736 66 1.1 506 69
1991 SBA 29-Jul-91 31-Mar-92 780 70 0.5 439 56
1992 EFF 31-Mar-92 30-Mar-96 4,020 361 2.2 4,020 100
1996 SBA 12-Apr-96 11-Jan-98 720 47 0.4 613 85
1998 EFF 4-Feb-98 10-Mar-00 2,080 135 0.9 0 0
2000 SBA-SRF 10-Mar-00 23-Jan-03 19,937 942 8.4 9,756 49
2003 SBA 24-Jan-03 31-Aug-03 2,175 103 2.3 2,175 100
2003 SBA 20-Sep-03 5-Jan-06 8,981 424 9.7 4,171 46
2018 SBA 20-Jun-18 19-Jun-21 40,714 1,277 8.7 14,714 36
nwod nwarDdevorppA
Table 1.
ARGENTINA'S ARRANGEMENTS WITH THE IMF (1983-2018)
1  This framework is applied to funding volumes above 145% of a country’s 
quota annually and above 435% of its quota cumulatively. 
2  In June, Argentina obtained additional one-year financing of $5.65 billion: 
$2.5  billion from the IDB, $1.75  billion from the World Bank and 
$1.4 billion from the CAF-Development Bank of Latin America.  Similarly, 
the Argentine authorities intend to increase the $11 billion swap facility 
with the People’s Bank of China which ends in July 2020.     
3  The amounts of the agreement are denominated in SDRs. The equivalent 
dollar value relates to the exchange rate used by the IMF when the 
agreement was approved in June and amended in October.
4  The Executive Board approved the request for waivers of non-
observance for some end-September performance criteria: the reserves 
floor, the reduction of net financing to government and the ceiling on 
non-deliverable forwards. By contrast, Argentina met all the fiscal targets 
by the end-September deadline.  
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of the financing drawable is envisaged in exchange for faster fiscal 
consolidation (the primary deficit target of zero is brought forward 
one year with respect to the initial programme), the replacement of 
the inflation targets by a more straightforward monetary anchor, 
focused on control of the monetary base, and the adoption of a 
floating exchange rate regime, with limited room for intervention by 
the central bank. Furthermore, given the short-term risks, the IMF 
will increase the frequency of its monitoring of the programme until 
the end of the year.
Argentina has had a long history of agreements with the IMF since 
1983, especially between 1989 and 2006, with successive programmes 
close in time and, generally, of a high amount (see Table 1). The current 
agreement is for the highest amount in the history of the IMF,5 
although in terms of quota and GDP it ranks behind the 
agreements with Greece, Ireland and Portugal (see Chart 2).
Argentina and the IMF are entering a new, open crisis-resolution 
phase following the draft agreement reached in September. 
More important than the increase in the volume of lending is the 
fact that 90% of that amount may be disbursed during the first 
half of the life of the arrangement, which means a loss of 
leverage for the Fund against a backdrop of high uncertainty. 
From a broader perspective, considerations of global financial 
stability, and the delicate circumstances for emerging 
economies as a whole, come into play. The IMF’s short-term 
liquidity stands below 200 billion SDRs for the first time since 
the beginning of 2011, but it remains sufficient and does not 
require alternative sources of funding to the quotas, as long as 
the demand for financing from the Fund does not increase 
substantially.
BOX 1 THE IMF’S AGREEMENT WITH ARGENTINA (cont’d)
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FURTHER TO THE REVIEW OF THE SBA, LENDING INCREASED AND THE FINANCING AVAILABLE WAS BROUGHT FORWARD
SOURCE: IMF.
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Chart 2
ARGENTINA IS THE IMF'S BIGGEST PROGRAMME IN TERMS OF AMOUNT, THOUGH NOT OF QUOTA OR GDP
DownloadEXCEL
Excel
5  Except for the successive Flexible Credit Lines (FCL) arranged with 
Mexico as from 2011, which currently amount to $88.2 billion (700% of 
Mexico’s quota).
